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Abstract
One of the primary goals of household studies of infectious disease transmission
is to estimate the household secondary attack rate (SAR), the probability of direct
transmission from an index case A to a susceptible household member B during A’s
infectious period. In a household with m susceptibles and a single index case, the
number of secondary infections is often treated as a binomial(m, p) random variable
where p is the SAR. This assumes that all subsequent infections in the household are
transmitted directly from the index case. Because a given transmission chain of length
k from A to B has probability pk, it is thought that chains of length k > 1 can be
ignored when p is small. However, the number of transmission chains of length k from
A to B can be large, so the total risk of infection through any chain of length k can
be much greater than pk. In simulations, we show that estimation of the SAR using a
binomial model is biased upward and produces confidence intervals with poor coverage
probabilities. Accurate point and interval estimates of the SAR can be obtained using
chain binomial models or pairwise survival analysis.
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In infectious disease epidemiology, the household secondary attack rate (SAR) is the
probability of disease transmission from an infected household member A to a susceptible
member B during A’s infectious period. The SAR is used to assess the transmissibility of
disease and to evaluate control measures (1, 2). Household surveillance data from emerging
infections is often used to estimate the SAR (2–8). Almost all of these studies assume
that the number of secondary infections in a household is a binomial(m, p) random variable,
where m is the number of susceptible household members and p is the household SAR. This
assumption seems reasonable because a given transmission chain of length k occurs with
probability pk, which is negligible when p is small and k > 1.
This reasoning neglects the fact that the number of possible transmission chains of length
k can be large, and any one of these paths can transmit infection from an index case A to
a susceptible household member B. A transmission chain of length k > 1 from the A to B
can be specified by choosing k − 1 individuals from the m − 1 other susceptible household
members. Each ordering of these k − 1 individuals determines a unique transmission chain,
so the total number of paths of length k from A to B within the household equals the number
of permutations of k − 1 objects chosen from m− 1 objects, which is
P (m− 1, k − 1) = (m− 1)!
(m− k)! (1)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. Table 1 shows that the number of paths of length k from a given
susceptible to the index case can grow quickly with household size. Because of the risk
of infection along each of these paths, the total risk of infection in susceptible household
members can be much greater than the SAR. In a binomial model, this additional risk of
infection is attributed erroneously to direct transmission from the index case, so the point
estimate of the SAR is biased upward.
There are two ways around this difficulty. In a disease where the latent period (between
infection and the onset of infectiousness) is much longer than the infectious period, multiple
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generations of infection within the household would be clearly separated. A binomial model
could be used to estimate the risk of infection within a time interval designed to capture
only the first generation of infection. However, most infectious diseases important to public
health can have overlapping generations of infection within households.
A second way around this difficulty is to change the target parameter. Instead of esti-
mating the household SAR, we could estimate the probability that a susceptible is infected
by transmission within his or her household, whether or not the infection is transmitted
directly from the index case. We’ll call this the household final attack rate (FAR). When
the household SAR is constant, the household FAR increases with household size as shown
in Figure 1. A constant FAR can occur only when the SAR decreases with household size,
so the change in target parameter leads to a different model of transmission unless all house-
holds have the same size. While the SAR remains clearly defined in households with multiple
index cases or transmission from outside the household, the FAR does not extend so easily
to these settings. Here, we assume a single index case and no transmission from outside the
household so both the SAR and FAR are clearly defined.
To estimate the FAR, each household must be followed up for the entire duration of
the within-household outbreak. An unbiased estimate of the household FAR could then be
obtained by calculating the proportion of susceptibles who are infected, as in a binomial
model. Each time a susceptible household member is infected, the risk of infection in the
remaining susceptibles increases. The binomial variance assumes that infections in differ-
ent household members are independent, but infections within a household are positively
correlated. Because of this correlation, the binomial model underestimates the variance of
the number of infections in a household. Thus, binomial confidence intervals will have poor
coverage probabilities. To address this issue, cluster adjusted variances have been used to
account for correlation among household members (2).
In this paper, we use analytical calculations and simulations to illustrate the dangers
of using a binomial model to analyze the transmission of infection within households. Our
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results indicate that the household FAR can be estimated accurately as long as the variance is
cluster-adjusted to account for the correlation of infection within households. To estimate the
household SAR, chain binomial models (9,10) or pairwise survival analysis (11,12) should be
used. We use household surveillance data collected by the Los Angeles County Department
of Public Health during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic to illustrate the practical
advantages of these methods over a binomial analysis.
Methods
Our analytical calculations and simulations assume a uniform secondary attack rate within
households and no infection from outside the household, which are assumptions shared by
statistical analyses of household transmission based on the binomial model. We used proba-
bility generating functions (PGFs) to calculate the true outbreak size distributions at differ-
ent combinations of number of susceptibles (m) and SAR (p). We then performed simulations
of household outbreaks at these same combinations of household size and SAR.
Household outbreak size distributions
Assume that each infectious member of a household makes infectious contact with each other
member of the household with probability p during his or her infectious period. Let pmi be
the probability that i out of m susceptibles are infected by within-household transmission in
a household with a single index case. Then
gm(x) =
m∑
i=0
pmix
i (2)
is the probability generating function (PGF) for the outbreak size distribution in a house-
hold with m susceptibles and one index case. A household with zero susceptibles has zero
secondary infections with probability one, so g0(x) = 1.
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The PGF for the outbreak size distribution in a household with m + 1 susceptibles can
be derived from the PGFs for smaller households. Imagine a household with m susceptibles
of whom i were infected. Now imagine that the household had one more susceptible. The
additional susceptible person would remain uninfected only if he or she escaped infection
from all i + 1 infected household members, which occurs with probability (1− p)i+1. If the
additional susceptible is not infected, the total number of infections in the household is i.
With probability 1− (1− p)i+1, the additional susceptible is infected and acts like an index
case in a household containing the m − i susceptibles who were not infected. In this case,
there are i+ 1 infections plus the number infected among the m− i remaining susceptibles,
which has the PGF gm−i(x). Therefore,
gm+1(x) =
m∑
i=0
pmi
[
(1− p)i+1xi + (1− (1− p)i+1)xi+1gm−i(x)] (3)
The first few iterations yield
g0(x) = 1, (4)
g1(x) = (1− p) + px, (5)
g2(x) = (1− p)2 + 2p(1− p)2x+ (3p2 − 2p3)x2 (6)
which can be checked by hand. We calculated these polynomials using Python code available
in the Web Appendix (SARcode.py). As shown in equation (2), the coefficient on xi in the
PGF gm(x) is the probability that i of m susceptibles are infected in a household outbreak
started by a single index case. Using these probabilities, we can calculate the mean and
variance of the number of infections among the m susceptibles.
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Household outbreak simulations
We simulated household outbreaks using Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs (13, 14), where each
pair of nodes is connected independently with probability p. In our graphs, each node
represents a household member and p is the SAR. One node is fixed as the index case, and
all household members connected to the index case by a series of edges are infected.
We performed 10,000 simulations for each combination of household size and SAR. In
each simulation, there were 200 independent households of the same size. We used logistic
regression to calculate the proportion of susceptible household members who were infected
with a 95% confidence interval. We then calculated a cluster-adjusted confidence interval
using the multi-way clustering method of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (15), which is im-
plemented in the R package multiwayvcov (16). All confidence intervals were calculated on
the logit scale as βˆ ± 1.96σ where βˆ = logit(pˆ) is the estimated log odds of infection and σ
is the unadjusted or cluster-adjusted standard error estimate. Finally, we transformed the
confidence intervals to the probability scale and estimated the coverage probabilities for the
true household SAR and the true household FAR.
Simulations were implemented in Python version 3.5.1 (www.python.org) using NumPy
version 1.11 (www.numpy.org), NetworkX version 1.11 (networkx.github.io), and pan-
das version 0.18.0 (www.pandas.pydata.org). Statistical analysis was performed in R ver-
sion 3.3 (www.r-project.org) using RPy2 version 2.7.0 (rpy2.bitbucket.io). These soft-
ware packages are free and open-source, and the code is available in the Web Appendix
(SARcode.py).
Household data analysis
We use influenza A (H1N1) household surveillance data collected by the Los Angeles County
Department of Public Health (LACDPH) between April 22 and May 19, 2009 to give a
practical example of biased estimation of the household SAR using a binomial model. The
data was collected using the following protocol (11):
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1. Nasopharyngeal swabs and aspirates were taken from individuals who reported to the
LACDPH or other health care providers with acute febrile respiratory illness (AFRI),
defined as a fever ≥ 100◦F plus cough, core throat, or runny nose. These specimens
were tested for influenza, and the age, gender, and symptom onset date of the AFRI
patient were recorded.
2. Patients whose specimens tested positive for pandemic influenza A(H1N1) or for in-
fluenza A of undetermined subtype were enrolled as index cases. Each of them was
given a structured phone interview to collect information about his or her household
contacts. They were asked to report the symptom onset date of any AFRI episodes
among their household contacts.
3. When necessary, a follow-up interview was given 14 days after the symptom onset date
of the index case to assess whether any additional AFRI episodes had occurred in the
household, including their illness onset date.
For simplicity, we assume all AFRI episodes among household members were caused by
influenza A(H1N1) and that all household members except the index case were susceptible
to infection. All analyses use natural history assumptions adapted from Yang et al. (17)
and identical to those in Kenah (18,19). In the primary analysis, we assumed an incubation
period of 2 days, a latent period of 0 days, and an infectious period of 6 days. In a sensitivity
analysis, we also considered 8-day and 10-day infectious periods.
We estimated the household SAR for 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) using unadjusted
and cluster-adjusted binomial models, parametric pairwise survival analysis, and a chain
binomial model. All analysis was conducted in R version 3.3 (www.r-project.org). Pairwise
survival models are implemented in the R package transtat, which is available on GitHub
(github.com/ekenah/transtat). The code is available in the Web Appendix (LAsar.R).
To see how well the SAR estimates fit the data, we simulated outbreaks in the Los
Angeles households using SAR point estimates from the binomial model, the chain binomial
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model, and pairwise survival models. We performed 2,000 simulations for each estimate.
In each simulation, we calculated the number of infections among susceptible household
members. These simulations were implemented in Python version 3.5.1 (www.python.org)
using NetworkX version 1.11 (networkx.github.io). Statistical analysis was performed in
R version 3.3 (www.r-project.org) using RPy2 version 2.7.0 (rpy2.bitbucket.io). The
code is available in the Web Appendix (SAR rgraph.py).
Binomial models The binomial analysis was conducted in two different ways. First, we
used an intercept-only logistic regression model to get unadjusted and multi-way cluster
adjusted (15) confidence intervals exactly as in the simulation studies. Second, we used
a generalized estimating equations (GEE) model to get a second set of cluster-adjusted
confidence intervals (20).
Pairwise survival analysis Pairwise survival analysis estimates failure times in ordered
pairs consisting of an infectious individual and a susceptible household member. The pair
AB is at risk of transmission starting with the onset of infectiousness in A, and failure occurs
if A infects B. This failure time, called a contact interval is right-censored if B is infected
by someone other than A or if observation of the pair stops. To account for uncertainty
about who-infected-whom, the overall likelihood is the sum of the likelihoods for all possible
combinations of who-infected-whom consistent with the data (11). The survival function
S(τ, θ) is the probability that the contact interval is greater than τ , where θ is a parameter
vector. If θ0 is the true value of the parameter and the infectious period is ι, then the
household SAR is 1− S(ι, θ0). To get a point estimate of the SAR, the unknown true value
θ0 is replaced by a maximum likelihood estimate θˆ.
We used the exponential, Weibull, and log-logistic distributions. For the exponential
distribution, S(τ, λ) = exp(−λτ) where λ is the called the rate parameter. For the Weibull
distribution, S(τ, λ, κ) = exp[−(λτ)κ] where λ is the rate and κ is called the shape parameter.
For the log-logistic distribution, S(τ, λ, κ) = [1 + (λτ)κ]−1 for rate λ and shape κ. For all
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three distributions, λ > 0 and κ > 0 so we defined our likelihoods in terms of their natural
logarithms lnλ and lnκ. Standard maximum likelihood estimation was used to get point
estimates and a covariance matrix for these parameters. To get a 95% confidence interval for
the SAR, we sampled lnλ and lnκ from their approximate multivariate normal distribution,
calculated the household SAR for each one, and took the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of this
distribution as confidence limits.
Chain binomial model The chain binomial model assumes that each susceptible house-
hold member escapes infection from each infectious household member with probability α0
each day. An individual B who is exposed to k infectious household members on day t will
escape infection on day t with probability αk0 and will be infected on day t with probability
1−αk0. The likelihood contribution of B is the product of these likelihood contributions over
all days where B was at risk of infection, and the overall likelihood is the product of the
likelihood contributions of all susceptibles who were at risk of infection for at least one day.
If the infectious period is ι days, then the household SAR is 1−αι0. To get a point estimate
of the SAR, the unknown true α is replaced by a point estimate αˆ. Because α ∈ [0, 1], our
likelihood was defined in terms of logit(α) = ln α
1−α . Standard maximum likelihood estima-
tion was used to get a point estimate αˆ and a variance estimate. Confidence intervals were
calculated on the logit scale and transformed back to the probability scale. For simplicity,
we have assumed that the probability of escaping infection from an infectious household
member does not depend on how long he or she has been infectious or on any pairwise or
individual-level covariates. More sophisticated models can allow the escape probability to
vary with the time since infection or with covariates (9, 10).
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Results
Household outbreak simulations
Figure 1 shows the household FAR calculated using PGFs (lines) and from simulations
(symbols) as a function of the true SAR. There is excellent agreement between the analytical
calculations and the simulations. Both show that the household FAR is always larger than
the household SAR when there is more than one susceptible. Thus, a binomial model will
produce a point estimate of the SAR that is biased upward whenever there is more than one
susceptible household member. At a fixed SAR, the difference between the SAR and the
FAR increases with household size.
Figure 2 shows the household SAR coverage probabilities for unadjusted and cluster-
adjusted binomial 95% confidence intervals. The coverage probabilities are always lower
than 95%. Even for small households, the coverage probabilities decrease rapidly as the true
SAR increases. Cluster adjustment increased the coverage probabilities only slightly. With
or without adjustment for clustering by household, a binomial model cannot produce reliable
point or interval estimates of the household SAR.
The simulation results in Figure 1 show that a binomial model can produce accurate point
estimates of the household FAR. Figure 3 shows coverage probabilities of unadjusted and
cluster-adjusted 95% confidence intervals for the household FAR. The coverage probabilities
for unadjusted confidence intervals are always below 95%, and they decrease with increasing
household size and SAR. Adjustment for clustering by household corrects this problem,
producing coverage probabilities near 95% for all household sizes. Thus, a binomial model
can produce reliable point and interval estimates of the household FAR as long as clustering
within households is taken into account.
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Household data analysis
In the LACDPH pandemic influenza A(H1N1) data, there were 58 households with a total of
299 members. There were 99 infections, of which 62 were index cases (4 of the 58 households
had co-primary cases) and 27 were household contacts with an AFRI. The median household
size was 5 (range: 2-20), so multiple infection pathways within households is a practical—not
just theoretical—problem for estimation of the household SAR.
Table 2 shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the household SAR. As
expected, a binomial model produces a much higher estimate than pairwise survival or the
chain binomial models. Adjustment for clustering produced a wider confidence interval, and
multiway cluster adjustment and GEE produced very similar results. The pairwise survival
and chain binomial models produced nearly identical point estimates of the household SAR.
Among the pairwise survival models, the exponential had the lowest Akiake Information
Criterion (AIC) at 280.5 versus 281.9 for the Weibull model and 281.8 for the log-logistic
model. The exponential model produced a much narrower confidence interval than the other
two pairwise survival models. Among chain binomial models, the closest equivalent to the
exponential pairwise survival model is the model with a constant α, so we did not attempt
to fit more complex models. The confidence interval from the chain binomial model is wider
than the exponential pairwise survival model but narrower than those of the Weibull and
log-logistic models. Similar results were obtained for 8-day and 10-day infectious periods,
with slightly higher estimates for the household SAR (not shown).
Figure 4 shows histograms of the simulated numbers of infections for the binomial es-
timate, the chain binomial model, and the exponential and log-logistic pairwise survival
models. In each panel, a vertical black line indicates the 27 observed infections. Simula-
tions using the binomial estimate always produced many more infections than were observed.
Simulations using estimates from the chain binomial and pairwise survival models predict a
number of infections with a distribution centered near the observed number. The true house-
hold SAR, to the extent one exists, is almost certainly far below the binomial estimates and
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close to the estimates from the other models.
Discussion
Even when the SAR is small, it is important to account for the risk of infection through
multiple generations of infection within households. Unless generations of infection are
clearly separated in time, a binomial estimate of the SAR will be biased upward and have
a confidence interval with low coverage probability. A binomial model can estimate the
household FAR accurately if cluster-adjusted confidence intervals are used. However, most
epidemiologic questions involving person-to-person transmission are framed more naturally
in terms of the SAR.
Using logistic regression, it is possible to generalize an analysis based on a constant FAR
to associate the risk of infection in a household outbreak with individual-level or household-
level covariates. Similarly, an analysis based on the SAR can be generalized to allow the
probability or hazard of transmission to depend on individual-level, pairwise, and household-
level covariates. In the ordered pair ij, the individual-level covariates of i can be associated
with infectiousness and the individual-level covariates of j can be associated with suscepti-
bility, allowing simultaneous estimation of covariate associations with both (19). Analysis
based on the SAR allows more detailed scientific insight into disease transmission than an
analysis based on the FAR.
The household SAR can be clearly defined and estimated even when there are multiple
index cases, a risk of infection from outside the household, or loss to follow-up (10). The chain
binomial model can include a probability of infection from the environment or community
outside the household in each time unit, and pairwise survival analysis can include a hazard
of infection from the environment or community. Both models can explicitly account for
right-censored observations or delayed entry (11). Models based on the household FAR are
difficult or impossible to extend to these situations.
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Infectious disease data from households or other groups of close contacts should always
be analyzed using chain binomial models or pairwise survival analysis to estimate hazards
or probabilities of transmission. The primary obstacle to the adoption of these methods
has been the lack of available software. Chain binomial models are available in the free
software package TranStat (www.cidid.org/transtat), which incorporates several advanced
methods (21, 22) and has been used in analyses of influenza (17), Zika (23), and Ebola
virus (24) transmission. The free and open source transtat package for R, which we used to
analyze the LA household data above, includes parametric pairwise survival models and will
be expanded to include nonparametric (18) and semiparametric (19) pairwise survival models
as well as chain binomial models. We hope the use of statistical methods designed specifically
for person-to-person transmission will help infectious disease epidemiologists contribute even
more effectively to science and public health.
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Susceptibles Path length (k)
(m) 2 3 4 5
4 3 6 6 0
6 5 20 60 120
10 9 72 504 3024
Table 1: Number of paths from the index case to a susceptible.
95% confidence interval
Model pˆ Lower limit Upper limit
Binomial (unadjusted) 0.148 0.106 0.197
Binomial (multiway cluster adjusted) 0.148 0.087 0.239
Binomial (GEE) 0.148 0.088 0.238
Pairwise survival (exponential) 0.066 0.062 0.071
Pairwise survival (Weibull) 0.067 0.048 0.114
Pairwise survival (log-logistic) 0.069 0.049 0.119
Chain binomial 0.067 0.046 0.094
Table 2: Estimates of the household SAR with 95% confidence limits. The pairwise survival
and chain binomial analyses assume a 2-day incubation period and 6-day infectious period.
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Figure 1: The household FAR as a function of the SAR for households with different numbers
of susceptibles (m) from analytical calculations (lines) and simulations (symbols). We assume
a single index case, so the total household size is m + 1. When there is more than one
susceptible, the FAR is always greater than the SAR.
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Figure 2: Coverage probabilities of binomial 95% confidence intervals for the household
SAR with different numbers of susceptibles (m). Gray lines are coverage probabilities for
unadjusted confidence intervals, and black lines are coverage probabilities for cluster-adjusted
confidence intervals. Both unadjusted and adjusted confidence intervals have low coverage.
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Figure 3: Coverage probabilities of binomial 95% confidence intervals for the household
FAR with different numbers of susceptibles (m). Gray lines are coverage probabilities for
unadjusted confidence intervals, and black lines are coverage probabilities for cluster-adjusted
confidence intervals. Coverage of the HAR is much higher than coverage of the SAR, but
unadjusted confidence intervals still have low coverage. Confidence intervals adjusted for
within-household clustering have coverage probabilities close to 95%.
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Figure 4: Simulated numbers of infections in the LA households based on SAR estimates
from different models. The vertical black lines indicate the 27 observed infections. The
binomial estimate produces far more infections than observed, but the other household SAR
estimates fit the observed data well.
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